The Telegraph reported on December 18 1968 that its own proprietor, Lord Hartwell (Michael Berry), managing editor, S. R. 'Roy' Pawley, and two correspondents were on the list. Pawley, who "felt flattered", issued a denial two days later to The Times and claimed his contact with intelligence had ended in 1945. The Observer's editor, David Astor, wrote on the 22nd: 'It is hard to believe that Russians themselves take their own stories seriously. They should know that the only spy we have had working on the Observer -and that without our knowledge -was one of theirs -Kim Philby."
Former senior MI6 officer Philby had been employed by the Observer as a 'stringer' when he defected to Moscow in 1963. One foreign correspondent named in the Russian article, Edward Crankshaw, dismissed it all as a "big joke"; whilst former Economist journalist, Brian Crozier, said it was "completely untrue". The Guardian reported on December 21 that the "absurd" story had "caused a great deal of amusement in Fleet Street and the Foreign Office", particularly "the reference to Lord Arran" of the Daily Mail. He was listed as agent "BIN-946" and was said to be in contact with MI6 officer, Count Frederick Venden Heuvel, code-named "Z-1". Arran had helped "BIN" in "the solution of operative problems that arise and furnishes general information on questions connected with newspapers" (Lyadov and Rozin 1969) .
Dismissed by the British press as Soviet propaganda, the Izvestiya story soon disappeared from the papers. The BBC's Chief External Services Publicity Officer, anxious that the story might develop into a wider investigation, was able to report to senior officials in the BBC that newspapers had responded to the Arran claim with "cartoons and humorous comment". (BBC File) He was informed that the Chief Editor at the Daily Mirror, Edward Pickering, thought the Soviet documents "profoundly uninteresting" and was "determined not to spend good money on stuff containing no possible story". When the Russians came back in the New Year with further accusations, the BBC External Services noted that "only one newspaper reported it" (BBC File).
The BBC External Services made efforts to obtain a set of the Izvestiya documents as they "might be useful one day" and approached its contact with the Foreign Office's propaganda unit, the Information Research Department, Mrs Josephine O'Connor Howe. She, however, thought it "wrong and inadvisable" as "any documents likely to implicate the corporation were already available to it". She was also "feeling some sympathy with IRD's friends" -i.e. MI6 -for the way its activities were being exposed. (BBC File) This was an indication that those documents dealing specifically with the BBC were regarded as genuine.
This had been a KGB propaganda exercise but, if we ignore the ideological rhetoric, was there any substance to the allegations? This paper analyses the Izvestiya list and its provenance. It scrutinises the relationship during the Cold War between MI6 and certain newspapers, traces the intelligence ties of individual journalists, and their reporting of key historical events. Were journalists active players in helping to shape and frame perceptions and debates of the Cold War? Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (2009:intro.) 
in Spinning Intelligence believe that
This menage a trois of spooks, hacks and the public is worthy of serious attention, because it is a relationship of great dependencies, synergies and feedback loops. Intelligence and the media -blood brothers separated at birth -operate within the realities established by the societies from which they spring. They can shape the nature and form of these societies.
Methodology
What has become apparent with the opening up of archives in Russia, Britain and the United States, is that many "factual" claims in Soviet Cold War publications often turn out to be accurate. Paul Maddrell (2005) , in a study of the East German publisher, Julius Mader, claims that many of the propagandist's exposes of Western espionage in the 1950s and 1960s were "indeed true, and his works, though obviously products of an ideology, represent a valuable resource for the historians of today". Moreover, they were "telling us much that our own governments did not want us to hear" and that we "surely have a right to know what secret activities the Western governments undertook during" during the Cold War.
Much of our knowledge of the post-war Polish anti-communist underground network, The Freedom and Independence Movement (Wolnosc I Niepodleglosc -WIN), which was backed by the CIA and MI6, comes from Soviet documents published in 1952 which disclosed that WIN had been from the beginning a controlled KGB operation.
Similarly, accounts of the CIA and MI6 exile operations in the Baltics in the late 1940s and early 1950s have largely been based on extensive accounts issued by Soviet propaganda outfits in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In both instances, confirmation of the Soviet versions came from CIA and MI6 officers. In referring to the Soviet account of the guerrilla operations in Lithuania with which he was involved, Thomas Remeikis wrote that "It is reasonable to believe that the Soviet versions are correct as far as facts, dates, names and places are concerned". (Grose 2000 :197-9 CD of the Soviet Press 1952 . Rositzke 1977 :170-1. Remeikis 1962 .)
The KGB released many "Facts Accuse" type propaganda booklets throughout the Eastern Bloc detailing covert activities by western intelligence agencies against rh Soviet regime. The Service had a long history of such propaganda and emphasised dezinformatsiya as a useful "Active Measure" (Covert Action) involving news agencies, sympathetic newspapers abroad, courted journalists and use of journalism as "cover". (Bittman 1984; Shultz 1985: Andrew and Mitrokhin 199 & 2005.) But most of its efforts were unsophisticated. This author did uncover one of the few successful projects, the planting of disinformation on the Italian left-wing newspaper, Paese Sera, in 1967. (Dorril 1983; Holland 2006) Following the escape and defection to Russia of the former British MI6 officers, Kim Philby and George Blake, the KGB was in the late 1960s engaged in a propaganda campaign concerning the nature of their activities, particularly against the Soviet Union. Some of the material was false, some of it was slanted and some was skewed in an effort to undermine relations between the UK and the United States (Kerr 1996) .
But the majority of it -Philby's book for instance -turned out to be accurate. For Izvestiya, there was little need to create disinformation because the KGB held a treasure trove of intelligence material from Philby and Blake; the latter responsible in the late 1950s for recruiting journalist agents (Blake 1990 ). The MI6 documents cited by Izvestiya were dated "September 1959", which fits with Blake's role in MI6 at that time and with evidence cited below suggests that they almost certainly came from him. The identity of MI6 officers named in the documents were not known in 1968 and were only confirmed many years later. It is possible that the documents are forgeries but other Blake generated material has been shown to be accurate. In February 1970, the paper published documents, to which Blake provided commentary, on MI6's Y-Section bugging of foreign embassies in the fifties. An MI6 officer who served with Y-Section later confirmed that the article was correct "in virtually all details" (Davies 2004:245) .
Because of the lack of intelligence records this is not an easy area to investigate, particularly since the archives have been, in Richard Aldrich's phrase (Aldrich 2001) , "dry-cleaned". MI6 has never officially released any post-war documents to the National Archives and a trawl of the archive by the author and the BBC's 'Document' programme for information on the Soviet claims drew a blank2. The BBC's own file on the "Communist attacks on the BBC", which includes most of the Soviet generated articles on MI6 journalist-agents, has been weeded with redactions on names of certain government personnel. However, the deficiency in official information should not invalidate research in this area. M. L. R. Smith (1999) suggests that often, "the barrier to scholarly interpretation is purely a mental hurdle that has grown up in the minds of academics, fortified by three decades of established methods of thinking".
Smith argues that the absence of official files becomes an excuse used to rationalise the failure to study problematic subjects. However, other sources of information can be used in a way compatible with academic research and since evidence is never complete, there is a requirement for academics to assess the available material.
By using a range of sources, including research on the history of MI6, newspaper archives and journalist memoirs, it is possible to test the Izvestiya allegations.
Increasingly newspaper archives are being digitalised through websites such as ProQuest Historical Newspapers Digital Archive, which makes it much easier for a researcher to trace particular articles and, importantly, for this research, follow the work of particular journalists. In addition, increasing numbers of foreign newspapers are also being digitalised which helps track relevant stories. There remain problems since many newspapers have still to be digitalised and even when they are, they do not always go back far enough and are not always as paper archives. Newspapers in the past often printed a number of editions with variations in stories that appeared and cases entirely disappeared. The research has been helped by that fact that in recent years, a number of foreign correspondents have openly admitted that they had a secret relationship with MI6 and have described that relationship in some detail (Horne 2012.) There has been journalist interest in this subject by British journalists (Knightley 2006; Leigh 2000; Keeble 2010 ) but until recently little in-depth investigation. The accounts have largely been anecdotal and not detailed. The exception to this has been with regard to the coverage of Northern Ireland in the mid-1970s by the British press. The revelations of senior information officer Colin Wallace concerning his role as an Army Information Officer involved with the propaganda unit, Information Policy, and his relationship with certain journalists covering The Troubles has given us the most detailed account to date of how journalists can be used by security and intelligence agencies using psychological warfare techniques such as "surfacing". (Curtis 1984; Foot 1990) Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2004:436) accepts that there is "irrefutable evidence of widescale, covert CIA penetration of the media in which journalistic collaboration ranged from "intelligence gathering to serving as go-betweens with spies". The relationship between American journalists and the CIA has been scrutinised in more detail (Bernstein 1977; LOORY 1974; Johnson 1986) . A series of articles in the New York Times in December 1977 revealed that the CIA had been helping to shape American foreign policy through its ownership of newspapers, news services and magazines abroad as "cover" organisations. The agency's "propaganda assets inventory" included scores of journalists working as salaried operatives whilst employed by newspapers or news agencies, with many more who received no financial reward having a close relationship with the intelligence agency. A further twelve full-time CIA officers operated under journalist cover (Aronson 1990:315-7) . James Aronson in his study of the press during the Cold War, believed that American journalists who cooperated with the CIA, did so out of "a myopic sense of team loyalty … which permitted them to discard a natural sense of scepticism about official pronouncements". This "guided or misguided patriotism" had discarded the matter of ethics and the obligation "to expose all false and misleading information". (Aronson 1990:317) This whole subject, however, remains a sensitive subject for the British media. Eric Downton (1987:339) , who admitted co-operating with MI6 whilst a Telegraph Paul Lashmar has detailed the institutional links and some of the ways British journalists collaborate -or collude -with official contacts in the intelligence services (Lashmar 2013) . The former home affairs editor of The Observer, David Rose, who was the paper's "accredited" intermediary with MI6, recalled that he was on the instructions of the MI6 contact to pretend that his meetings with him "never happened". His attribution to a source was to be so vague that no one would realise he had talked to the Service. (Rose 2007) The penalty for breaching these conditions was to "expect instant darkness: the refusal of all future access". In such a competitive newspaper market as the UK, failing to get the story has major consequences for the reporter concerned. In such a relationship, the delivering and the withholding of information puts the power in the hands of MI6, particularly since it is acknowledged that the Service has been the most difficult one for media to engage with. MI6 says that it only deals with journalists who have a reputation for "discretion and 
MI6 and journalists
At the end of the Second World War, there had been a debate inside MI6 on how to gather intelligence inside the Soviet Union with some officers viewing journalists as ideal agents since they had "natural cover" (West 2009:120-130) . They hoped the Soviets would become less suspicious of them as possible agents. The Izvestiya documents identified the MI6 sections co-ordinating journalist recruitment. The
Controller Production Research (C/PR), official sources confirm, had been set up in 1948 to arrange "cover for an agent" with "a British firm or organization", and to seek assistance from UK citizens travelling to the Soviet Union (Bower 1995:159 & 184) .
It was responsible for the Z-network of journalist-agents, sympathetic newspaper proprietors and subsidised news agencies run by Count Vanden Heuvel (Jeffrey, 2010:379; West 1998:116) . When Anthony Cavendish (1988) C/PR controlled the London Station (codenamed BIN) which organised anti-Soviet operations run from the UK (Davies 2004:191) . Izvestiya (Lyadov and Rozin 1969) claimed a sub-unit, "BIN/CO-ORD" -headed by a veteran officer, Edward Boxshallwas involved in "the use of the British press". Its remit was confirmed by Nicholas Elliott (Bower 1995:184 
Journalist-Agents
George Blake (1990) revealed in his memoirs that in the late fifties, MI6, lacking sources inside the Soviet Union, transformed the Controller of Production into an "agent-running organisation", headed by Arthur Franks (BIN-51). As CP/R deputy, Blake (BIN01/A) recruited journalists as "Agents" or "contacts" and were provided with "cover", set information gathering targets, and paid via secret bank accounts.
Former CIA Chief William Colby made a distinction between a "controlled agent" -whose loyalty was more to the agency than the newspaper -and a "contact" -who remained loyal to the newspaper: though this depended on the degree of influence exerted over the journalist (Johnson:1986 ). An alleged journalist-agent used by MI6 as a "potential source of information and operative data about the USSR" (Lyadov and Rozin 1969) was 'Henry Brandon' of the Sunday Times. His former editor, Harold Evans3 dismissed claims that Brandon was an agent, though the paper's intelligence specialist, Philip Knightley4, accepted that he was an MI6 "asset". The distinction being that an agent has a long-term relationship with the Service which may involve a handler, who sets requirements and the payment of a regular salary or fee may be involved, whereas an asset is likely to be used on specific operations with any payment being on an occasional basis. The latter included the journalist/author Norman Lewis, who had served with the Field Security Sections during the war and was employed post-war by the Sunday Times. According to his biographer, his reporting from Cuba at the time of the revolution was undertaken at the instigation of MI6's Tim Frenken, a member of the wartime Z Organisation. (Evans 2009:440-67) .
A third category is the "stringer" -someone who uses the journalist tag as "cover" to gather information for the Service whilst carrying out occasional journalist duties. Lee Telegraph's foreign news with direct access to the paper's proprietor (Lycett 1995:248; Faulks 1997:251 & 264) . One Telegraph correspondent, the Canadian, Eric Downton, employed in the Naval Intelligence Division with Fleming during the war, acknowledged his own recruitment by MI6 and witnessed in Vienna colleagues, such as Gordon Shepherd, being used as information gathers by MI6's George Kennedy Young (Downton 1987:229 & 326-8) .
Wartime MI6 officer, Malcolm Muggeridge admitted to fellow journalist Alan Watkins (1982) Izvestiya (Lyadov and Rozin 1969) claimed MI6 established a "good alliance" at the Observer with the Editor, David Astor, and journalists Mark Arnold-Forster and Soviet specialist Edward Crankshaw ("BIN 120"), who had been "used during his journey to the Soviet Union [and had] a very long record of such work". Crankshaw thought that either Philby or Blake were behind the article which was "a big joke". In
The Times (December 20 1968) Astor called the report "nonsense" and Arnold-Forster described it as "rubbish".
Astor had been turned down by MI6 for a wartime post, though he was used to help establish contact with members of the German opposition with whom he had links. In 1944, he worked with a unit liaising between the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the resistance in France (Dorril 2000:456) . In 1947, Astor8 was appointed editor of The Observer, where he employed Terence Kilmartin, who had worked for the MI6-sponsored Arab radio station, Sharq Al-Adna (Boyd 2003) , to run the Observer's Foreign News Service (which later received subventions from the 'secret vote'9).
Mark Arnold-Forster's uncle, Christopher, was Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence during the war and served as MI6's Chief Staff Officer on its post-war Reorganisation Committee (West 1988:12) Arnold-Forster's continuing intelligence ties is strikingly revealed in successive editions of his diaries (Benn 1987 (Benn & 1989 . Edward Crankshaw was of particular interest to the Soviets because "he is used to obtain intelligence information, and also to carry out other intelligence assignments". (West 2010:189) . Through an "indiscretion" on Tear's part, Downton (1987:343) learnt that the Sunday Times representative in Moscow, Cyril Ray, had also done "the journalist-agent thing".
According to MI6's George Kennedy Young11, "after a series of informal supper parties with the brightest SIS officers, a systematic study was started of the top Soviet power structure, its various personalities and cliques, and their associates in the armed forces and the KGB." With the support of Blake, Nigel Clive12 set up a group of Soviet experts, including Professor Leonard Schapiro, a wartime MI5 officer, whose book, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy (1955), established him as 'a penetrating critic of the Soviet regime'. As head of Russian Studies at the London School of Economics, he enlisted Soviet studies experts for MI6 (Reddaway, 1984) . It is often been stated that the contemporary activities of intelligence agencies, and British intelligence in particular, cannot be studied because by their nature, they are very secretive and there is no material for a study. However, this author has long argued that there is much more in the public domain than is realised and that intelligence agencies are heavily engaged with the press and, if not always visible, are active in the public arena. Although MI6 was officially tasked with political intelligence gathering it is clear that it also had a propaganda role much in line with Herman and Chomsky's five-filter model (1988) . Herman and Chomsky (1988) model claims that the media rely heavily on official sources from government/state agencies which are aggressive in promoting a favourable version of their activities. Such sources are "routine" in journalism but intelligence sources are too an extent, as Boyd-Barrett (2004:445) argues, a "departure" from the routine in that they are privileged because of the attached aura of secrecy which always sticks to such source material. Because of its uniqueness, journalists, editors and newspapers often depart from the standard practice of balancing one source against another or the attempt to secure additional verification from other sources. Too often there develops a cosy relationship between individual journalists and intelligence sources and there develops a controlled trade-off between support and access to information. MI6 had significant involvement in "agenda setting" (Herman and Chomsky 1988) during the early stages of the Vietnam War. Through its journalist assets and the use of briefings and privileged access to information and specialists it set about "framing" (Goffman 1986 ) how the debate took place on what was at stake. Drawing on the work of Richard C. Stanton (2007:193-4) , it can be seen that the use of disguised intelligence sources, which were seen as "credible" by journalists, allowed MI6 to shape, define and "force all interpretation of issues and events into a narrow frame" .
The audience was not only the British public but American officials and politicians who took a different line on the influence of the Soviet and Chinese communist governments in directing the war.
Edward Crankshaw was responsible for a series of ground breaking articles in the
Observer on the Moscow meeting in November 1960 of world communist parties, which witnessed a serious deterioration in Chinese/Soviet relations, and led to an intense debate within Western intelligence about the reality of the split. "There has come into our hands, Crankshaw wrote in the Observer (February 12 & 19 1961) , "a fully-documented report of the charges and counter charges between Peking and Moscow ... this report, which contains detailed summaries of hitherto secret correspondence, came from a satellite source." These articles were highly regarded by Kremlin watchers (Ford 2007; Griffiths 1962) "Charles" -senior MI6 officer, Frank Rendle -was at the centre of a major factional clash within MI6 and the CIA over the Sino-Soviet split (Dorril 2000:713-4) . Was the split real, which Rendle believed, or was it a deception to confuse Western governments, as stated by the CIA's Angleton. 
Conclusion
Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2004:448) suggests that we need to peer into a "black box" if we are to seek confirmation of the secret operational transactions that occur for the implementation of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model. This paper has shown that it is possible shed some light on the darkness. It has confirmed that there in the manipulation of the public opinion and the use of propaganda, there is a degree of fusion between state and news media practices that goes beyond the everyday dynamics. And that some journalists go well beyond, or rather against the call of duty, in their collaboration, direct or indirect, with third parties. This is the additional filter -the "buying out" of journalists or their employers by intelligence agencies -which Boyd-Barrett (2004) suggests is a sixth filter.
There is sufficient evidence in the public domain from journalists' own memoirs, archives, diaries and intelligence-derived material to suggest that the Izvestiya list is reliable and is based on MI6 files which Blake had handed over to the KGB in 1959.
The published names from the list reported by correspondents in Moscow were a small fraction of a much larger photographic list of journalist agents which was not released and possibly still resides in the KGB archives. Some of those additional names not included in the newspaper accounts are listed in the Appendix.
There is the question about the precise nature of the journalist ties to the intelligence service, MI6. Were the files based on casual contacts and exaggerated -a not unknown practice in intelligence agencies. Was there a legitimate relationship that might occur between a journalist seeking information from an intelligence officer; or did they record accurately the running of a journalist as an agent? Clearly, there were journalists who would dispute the term 'agent' and would class their own role as that of news-gatherer. There were, however, a small number of journalists who had an MI6 handler, and were provided with cover and received payment. As Philip Knightley wrote in the Guardian (May 24 2008), "All this could have been considered just a bit of James Bondish fun, but for the fact that it entitles every foreign security service to believe that all British journalists working abroad must be spies."
It seems that newspaper proprietors were willing to co-operate with MI6 in allowing the Service to use their journalists for assignments, intelligence-gathering, and for publishing very specific intelligence-related articles. The above study has touched on only small area but, hopefully, it has opened up possibilities for more wide-ranging studies of the press-intelligence relationship. It is known, for instance, that the main area of recruitment of journalists was in the Middle East. In the late 1940s, Hector
McNeil, a Foreign Office minister liaising with MI6, assured Cyrus Sulzberger (1969: 412 & 654) of the New York Times that British intelligence "only hires journalists in the Middle East". To date, little has been done on the precise role MI6-subsidised news agencies (see Fletcher, 1982; Jenks 2001 ) -files relating to more than a dozen such agencies have been held back from the National Archive -played in key events such as Suez. It is unlikely that MI6 is going to make available its files in this area of study but if researchers venture outside of the traditional archives and dig deep into material in the public domain, particularly given the increasing availability of digital newspaper archives, then we might be able to sketch out a more precise picture of what role the press really did play during the Cold War.
Notes

